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Another notable example of how copyright enforcement has moved well beyond addressing specific 
infringing content or individuals into Internet governance-based infrastructural enforcement is the 
graduated response method, terminating the Internet access of individuals that (allegedly and) repeatedly 
violate copyright. The case of the French Hadopi (Haute Autorité pour la Diffusion des Œuvres et la 
Protection des droits sur Internet), law first, agency next, both highly controversial, illustrates this 
strategy of dubious effectiveness for the purpose it is meant for, but of high disruptive potential for 
Internet users and access rights – and potentially affecting other, perfectly legitimate activities as a 
collateral effect. In this paper, we will describe the unexpected and perverse effects of this law using the 
notion of legislative serendipity to explain why this law has never reached the target it was intended for.  
  
 
Introduction 
In the information society, the production, distribution and manipulation of data, content, and information 
represents one of the main economic, political and cultural activities (Beniger, 2009). This led to the 
establishment of the so-called knowledge economy, where most of the wealth is generated through the 
exploitation of information (Kim & Mauborgne, 1999).  
The advent of digital technologies spurred the development of new information and communication 
technologies that greatly facilitate the production and dissemination of content. Through the Internet, 
information can be easily reproduced and distributed at a global scale, in virtually no time and at virtually 
no costs. While this provided new opportunities for right holders –and the creative industries more 
generally– to explore new business models and experiment with new added-value services, the same 
technologies also supported the practice of copyright infringement, which has nowadays become 
widespread on the Internet (Tehranian, 2007).  
Today, given the growing amount of piracy that is emerging online, the regulation of content production 
and reproduction has become an important challenge. In order to succeed, this challenge must be tackled 
with carefully drafted legislation that properly accounts for the specificities of the digital world (Litman, 
2001). Legislators that do not properly understand the social dynamics underlying the practices they are 
trying to regulate will always, and necessarily, encounter significant barriers when it comes to applying 
the law. In the process of public policy making and legal drafting, an important number of variables (and 
the relationships between them) remain uncertain. The success of the law ultimately depends on its 
implementation, and evaluation of the law must account for what its ensuing effects are:  “A law is an 
effort of Government and Parliament to create some order for a segment of society. Whether a law is 
effective in regulating that segment of society depends on the way that citizens use entitlements the law 
provides, on how administration officials exercise the authorities granted, and whether both citizens and 
officials comply with its rules” (Herweijer & Winter, 1995). When the effects of the law do not reflect 
what the law had originally been intended for, we are in a situation of legislative serendipity (defined in 
Section I). 
 
France has definitely been a pioneer on the copyright law front. Over the years, a number of legal reforms 
have been enacted into French legislation, although, when it came to assessing the law, the relevant 
criteria of evaluation (in terms of effectiveness, predictability, justice, equality, and the impact on the 
rules of law) were absent.  
After many years of experimentation with various  pieces of legislation aimed at reducing the rate of 
online copyright infringement (see e.g. the LCEN law1 of 2004, the DADVSI law2 of 2006, and Anti-
Counterfeiting law3 of 2007), in 2009, the HADOPI law4 (presented in Section II) introduced the 
‘graduated response’ into in French legislation with a view to discourage the use of peer-to-peer file-
sharing networks for the illegitimate exchange of copyrighted works. The law established a new 
governmental agency - the HADOPI - in charge of policing the network against copyright infringement 
(as described in Section II.1) and elaborated a graduated law enforcement procedure which has come to 
be regarded as the first implementation of the ‘three-strike regime’ (described in Section II.2), allowing 
for individuals that allegedly and repeatedly infringed copyright law to potentially be cut off the Internet. 
The law also introduced an obligation for Internet Services Providers (ISPs) to disclose the identity of 
alleged infringers (see Section II.3), along with a new administrative charge, as a complement to the 
charge for copyright infringement, for failure to secure one’s Internet connection (Section II.4).  
The HADOPI law was an attempt from the legislator at devising a new and innovative way to reduce the 
amount of piracy on the Internet. Today, however, the three-strike regime is regarded by many as a 
failure. Indeed, the graduated response did not succeed at discouraging, nor even slightly reducing the rate 
of copyright infringement. Instead, it is generally believed that the HADOPI law actually had a series of 
perverse effects (analysed in Section III) that led to a decrease, rather than an increase in the sales of 
digital content (Section III.1), and even diminished the opportunities for copyright enforcement by 
pushing users towards using more sophisticated tools or techniques (described in Section III.2) in order to 
escape from the draconian character of the law. Besides, the law has been accused of being both 
disproportionate and unconstitutional, to the extent that it was impinging upon the fundamental rights of 
freedom of expression and freedom of access to information, not respecting due process and reversing the 
presumption of innocence (Section III.3).  
While the actual effects of the law are inevitably difficult to measure, in practice, it is nonetheless 
possible to estimate the impact that the law had on the rate of copyright infringement (e.g. by looking at 
its effects on the use of peer-to-peer file-sharing networks; or other types of platforms for the exchange of 
digital content) and balance them with the costs imposed by the law (e.g. according to its effects on 
privacy, anonymity, and freedom of expression). 
                                                   
1 LOI n° 2004-575 du 21 juin 2004 pour la confiance dans l'économie numérique 
2 LOI n° 2006-961 du 1er août 2006 relative au droit d'auteur et aux droits voisins dans la société de 
l'information (DADVSI) 
3 LOI n° 2007-1544 du 29 octobre 2007 de lutte contre la contrefaçon 
4 LOI n° 2009-669 du 12 juin 2009 favorisant la diffusion et la protection de la création sur internet  
Yet, in spite of its apparent incapacity to counteract copyright infringement, the real impact of the law lies 
in the more subtle, unintended consequences it engendered (illustrated in section IV). It is, in fact, 
important to assess the success of the law not only against what it was actually meant to achieve, but also, 
and perhaps most importantly, according to what it achieved in addition to (or beyond) what it was 
actually meant to. This relates, most notably, to its impact on the privacy and anonymity of users (Section 
IV.1), as well as on the deployment of grassroots community mesh networks in France (Section IV.2). 
While they might have serious negative effect on the civil liberties and autonomy of users, most of these 
consequences were, however, unintended, and had not been properly accounted for by the legislator in 
charge of drafting the law. They are, therefore, likely to remain for the most part unnoticed when 
assessing the actual impact and effectivity of the law.  As such, the HADOPI laws constitutes a perfect 
illustration of legal serendipity –defined as the emergence of unexpected side-effects in the 
implementation of a rational decision, be it a normative or judicial decision. Thus, after providing a 
general introduction to the concept of serendipity (Section I.1) and how it can be transposed into the legal 
field through the notion of legislative serendipity  (Section I.2), the remainder of this paper will illustrate 
how the HADOPI law can be described as a case of negative serendipity in the legal field.  
 
 
I. Introduction to legislative serendipity 
 
1. What is serendipity? 
 
Serendipity is the art of discovering new things by observing, and learning from unexpected situations. It 
can lead to the emergence of a theory, a law or perhaps simply an observation, which had never 
been planned and therefore not intentionally sought for (Van Andel & Bourcier, 2012). Coined 
by Walpole (1754) in the tale “Travels and adventures of Three Princes of Serendip”, the 
“serendipity pattern” has rapidly been applied to the field of science, eager to understand how 
people make discoveries. Yet, the ability to extract knowledge from an unexpected event covers 
all areas of human activity, including business, law and politics.   
Serendipity comes from a propensity for exploiting the unexpected. It starts from the observation 
of a completely new situation, which requires a novel interpretation of a particular result. If 
investigation consists in the careful observation of certain facts, from which a conclusion can be 
drawn, serendipity emerges when these facts come to be regarded as the sign of something else. 
Serendipity makes it possible to draw new conclusions based on unexpected outcomes, by 
reassessing the results in a different manner than it had been done thus far. In the realm of 
science, this can be described as speculation based on observations.  
Serendipity is present in all domains of human activity, although its impact has been, thus far, 
mostly analysed in the context of hard and/or experimental sciences. A much less investigated 
field of research is how serendipity affects social sciences, such as politics, law and  
jurisprudence. Indeed, as observed by Boudon (1991), social scientists are generally not 
interested in exploring the concepts of “chance” or “fortuity” because that would require them to 
admit that they could not anticipate the reasons why an event occurred.  
The discovery of “America” is perhaps the best example of serendipity outside of the hard 
sciences. Christopher Columbus, who was looking for a direct route to India, discovered the 
American continent instead. He found a whole new world, while he was looking for another 
ocean or sea.  Yet, this discovery was only possible because of his creative and open-minded 
intellectual approach, his attempt at looking for a different means to achieve the same goal. We 
could derive from there that a good definition of serendipity might be: Finding something better 
(or different) than what we are looking for. 
 
2. Legislative Serendipity  
 
When applied to the legal field, serendipity illustrates the unintended consequences (positive or 
negative) that a policy or law can produce on society. This opens up epistemological and, to 
some extent, political questions, by bringing up the relevance of the unexpected in public policy 
research and practice. In this regard, a particularly interesting application of serendipity that is 
worth exploring is the role it plays in the context of public action, i.e. in the elaboration of public 
policies and the drafting of normative rules.  
Public action is designed to promote good behaviours or discourage bad behaviours in a 
population of actors. As a general rule, governments and public administrations always plan the 
objectives and evaluate the impacts of public policies, before they are turned into legislation. 
Yet, their implementation into law might trigger many unintended consequences or even produce 
a series of perverse effects that could not have been readily foreseen by the policy makers 
themselves (Bourcier, 2011).   
What we call unintended consequences (sometimes referred to as unexpected or collateral 
effects) is a phenomenon that looks a lot like serendipity: a voluntary social or legal intervention 
that might lead to a series of unexpected and non premeditated effects. The term was popularised 
by American sociologist R.K. Merton (1936) in a seminal article investigating a well-known 
phenomenon: unintended consequences as that particular set of outcomes which are different 
from the one intended by a purposeful social action and which might even be counterproductive 
to that action. They can be roughly grouped into three categories: 
- Positive, unexpected benefits which generally regarded as the result of chance, luck or 
“pure serendipity” (e.g., the medieval policy of setting up large hunting reserves for the 
nobility has preserved green space throughout England and other places in Europe).  
- Negative, unexpected detriments occurring in addition to, or in substitution to the desired 
effect of the policy, and which make the problem worse (e.g., while irrigation schemes 
provide people with water for agriculture, they can increase waterborne diseases that 
might have devastating effects on health).  
- Perverse effects which are contrary to the original intention of the law (e.g. the 
construction of protective offshore structures in Bangladesh resulted in a much lower 
level of security overall, as people began moving closer to the shore due to a higher sense 
of security).5 
These three types of unintended consequences can easily be observed in the legal field, by 
looking at the “incidence” of legal norms to a particular target. As clearly expressed by J. 
Carbonnier (1988), “the phenomenon of incidence is a measure of both the effectiveness and 
ineffectiveness of the law”. When the law misses its target, it might be ineffective in one field, 
but highly effective in another, unexpected one (e.g. in the context of tax law, one tax that was 
meant to regulate the large sugar producers might ultimately affect the amateur jam makers).  
 
This problem is related to the gap that subsists between different levels of analysis. Oftentimes, 
there is a mismatch between the actual and intended effects of the law, because legislators take 
into account only part of the system, rather than the system as a whole. In fact, the boundaries of 
the system are not “natural”, they organically evolve according to the intended scope of the law. 
Some effects are "collateral" or “unintended” only because the law was reduced to a particular 
subset of actions, regardless of the impact it has on different types of actors or actions. If we 
change the level of observation, these effects automatically become part of the equation. 
Yet, in the context of collective action, limited feedback or communication might lead to 
substantial dysfunctions. Game theory provides a good illustration of these situations where a set 
of rational agents are trying to find a good strategy - the best strategy - for all circumstances, 
regardless of the strategy of the opponent. From the point of view of each individual actors, the 
best strategy is the one that will maximize individual gain or utility. The perverse effects of these 
strategies are only visible from an outsider perspective: only by observing the relationships and 
interactions between all of these actors, one can understand that they would each get a better 
payoff by coordinating their actions.  
The same can be said in the case of public policy or law making. Even if the policy makes sense 
and the law properly reflect such policy, after the legal provisions have been enacted, they often 
receive different interpretations, and possibly become subject to circumvention by specific 
categories of agents. As a result, the outcome of many public policies is often unexpected, and 
sometimes even contradictory or counterproductive. The reason is that the interactions of citizens 
seeking to maximize their own individual utility might produce an outcome that ultimately goes 
counter the overall intentions of the law. The perverse effect of the law can be seen as an 
                                                   
5 An example might illustrate how the attempt by public authorities to protect the population against a 
particular risk may engender a series of unexpected and disastrous consequences that could not be 
foreseen by policymakers themselves. In the sixties, engineers decided to build huge offshore structures 
in Bangladesh to protect coastal areas from erosion, high tides and natural disasters. Unfortunately, these 
structures gave such a big sense of security that people started settling on the shore. When a cyclone hit 
on the region in 1970, millions of people perished. For more details, see Van Andel & Bourcier (2009; 
p.212). 
 
aggregated result of the individual will of many individual actors that is not always in line with 
the collective will of society as a whole that the law was meant to regulate. 
Thus, to govern is to decide in an uncertain world. The law is generally considered an efficient 
means to conduct governmental policy and exercise constraints on human actions. Yet, in this 
uncertain world, little is known about the context of future actions or the set of possible 
interactions between individuals. Besides, the rules laid down by the laws are orders oriented 
towards specific classes or categories of persons, rather than individuals themselves. They could 
trigger a variety of unintended effects because their application depends on the circumstances 
and on the multiple interpretations that can be given to  a fact, a word, or an action. This means 
acknowledging that the regulatory bodies cannot predict in advance the actual or potential effects 
of every legislative intervention, since “instruments used with a view to attaining a specific goal 
may have other effects than anticipated” (Ten Heuvelhof & de Bruijn, 1995; p. 173).  
Legislators are thus faced with the difficult challenge to elaborate a set of rational rules and 
decisions that they know will produce unexpected effects as soon as they become part of the 
social fabric of society, i.e. as soon as they become embedded into a complex system of rules and  
interactions between players. These unintended effects - which Alain Anciaux (1995) defined as 
“serendipitous effects” - show that we all belong to a set of complex and dynamic systems, a 
network of ramified and reticulated systems that make it difficult to react in a preventive and 
consequential manner to any change in these systems6 (Van Andel & Bourcier, 2012). Laws may 
come with either positive or negative consequences for the players, depending on which side one 
takes. They might also be voluntarily diverted by certain actors or groups of actors, so that the 
observed side-effects might turn out to be even worse than the original scenario.7  
Research on serendipity might help shed some light not only on the act of discovery as a mental 
process, but also on the process of managing uncertainty as institutionalised practice. Public 
policies based on the attributions of consequences to actions are more likely to fail because their 
analysis may be distorted due to various simplifications or improper justifications. The larger is 
the interval of time between an action and its consequences, the greater is the chance that 
unexpected consequences will occur.  
Various solutions have been adopted to help public authorities incorporate uncertainty into the 
lawmaking process. Most of them require adopting a more pragmatic approach to decision-
making so as to better cope with uncertainty. One interesting example is, for instance, the 
                                                   
6 “Les “effets sérendips”  montrent que nous sommes dans des systèmes complexes dynamiques c’est-à-dire des 
systèmes ramifiés, réticulés et qu’il est difficile d’avoir une attitude conséquentialiste ‘à  un coup’”, in Van Andel & 
Bourcier (2012; p. 255). 
7 For example, most Western countries concerned by welfare policies have provided benefits 
guaranteeing a minimum income (revenu minimum) to people whose resources are low. These allocations 
have produced unexpected results (both positive and negative) that illustrate the problems encountered in 
the design of social aid.  
incorporation of sunset clauses stipulating that a particular law should cease to exist after a given 
period of time, or as soon as they have fulfilled their objectives (unless legislative action is taken 
to extend the law). Other solutions relate to the way in which public policies are elaborated and 
legislations are drafted. By providing public discussion forums accessible to many interested 
stakeholders, those who will be the most affected by the law can expose their objections on the 
applicability of the rules to come and their opinions as regards the possible consequences of 
these rules (see e.g. the public consultation for the Marco Civil in Brazil, or for the Law on the 
digital economy in France). Finally, the advent experimental laws, designed to promote a 
gradual, incremental approach to law-making, requires periodic evaluations of the effects of laws 
and encourage the creation of more flexible rules that can more easily adapt to technological 
advances.  
These were, however, not the methods that prevailed in the context of the implementation of the 
HADOPI law, one important piece of legislation adopted in France with a view to discourage 
copyright infringement online. In the following sections, we will present a general overview of 
the HADOPI law, and we will rely on the lessons learnt from previous research in the field of 
serendipity in order to compare the original intentions of the law with the actual (and for the 
most part unintended) consequences it had on copyright infringement, as well as other legitimate 
activities, including the exercise of users’ fundamental rights and civil liberties. 
 
II. General overview of the HADOPI law  
 
In France, the copyright regime implements a strong, but mostly ineffective system of criminal liability. 
Copyright infringement is regarded (just as counterfeiting) as a misdemeanor that is punishable by 3 years 
in prison and a fine up to 300.000 euros (see article L. 335-2 of the French Intellectual Property Code). In 
practice, however, charges for copyright infringement generally only results in low fines and hardly any 
convictions.  
In particular, with the advent of Internet and digital technologies, copyright infringement has become 
ubiquitous in the digital world. As a result of the deployment of many different peer-to-peer networks for 
the sharing of digital files (e.g. Napster, Kazaa, BitTorent, etc), more and more individuals can download 
and upload digital media files, whose legal status is sometimes difficult to ascertain. Online piracy has 
thus become commonplace, and generally perceived as a legitimate activity amongst Internet users. 
Indeed, Internet file-sharing is for the most part done for private purposes, without any intentions of 
commercial gains. It is thus difficult to prove the malicious intent of individual infringers - an essential 
requirement for criminal liability.8 This, in addition to the complexity of quantifying the damages caused 
by online piracy (Fisk, 2009; Barker, 2004; Boorstin, 2004), is such that imposing criminal liability for 
non-commercial file-sharing is generally considered to be neither fair, nor proportional to the actual 
damages incurred by the right holders.   
 
                                                   
8 In criminal law, intention is generally regarded as necessary element to constitute a crime. Except in the case of 
strict liability crimes, criminal liability cannot be imposed to a person who acted without intent.  
French Law n° 2009-669 “Creation et Internet”9 for the promotion and protection of creative works (so-
called HADOPI law) was introduced on June 12th 2009 with a view to encourage compliance with 
copyright law. It was immediately followed by Law n° 2009-1311 on the criminal protection of creative 
works on the Internet10 (HADOPI II law), introduced on October 28th 2009 to address some of the 
constitutionality concerns of the former law. Together, these two laws (along with a series of over 10 law 
decrees) establish a new regulatory framework which represents an attempt by the French government to 
counteract the inexorable rise of online copyright infringement by means of an innovative legislative 
solution known as the “graduated response”  (riposte graduée, in French). The most relevant components 
of these laws relate to the establishment of (1) a new governmental agency in charge of promoting the 
distribution and protection of creative works on the Internet; (2) a ‘three-strike regime’ for online 
copyright violations and illegal file-sharing; (3) an obligation for Internet Service Providers (ISP) to 
disclose information about their subscribers; and (4) a tort of ‘gross negligence’ for failure to secure one’s 
Internet connection. 
 
3. A new governmental agency: HADOPI 
 
The law establishes the Haute Autorité pour la Diffusion des œuvres et la Protection des droits d'auteur 
sur Internet (HADOPI), a governmental agency responsible for promoting the distribution and protection 
of creative works on the internet. Intended to replace the former Regulation of Technical Measures 
Authority created by the DADVSI law,11 this new governmental agency has been vested with the mandate 
to police the Internet against copyright infringement, as well as to ensure that Internet subscribers secure 
their connections to prevent the unauthorised redistribution of copyrighted material.  
Specifically, the HADOPI is composed of one College and  one Commission for the Protection of Rights. 
The functions of the College are defined within Article L.331-13 of the French Intellectual Property Code 
(IPC) and consist inter alia of monitoring both the legitimate and illegitimate uses of copyrighted works, 
protecting creative works against potential copyright violation on the Internet, and regulating the use 
technical measures for the protection of these works. The Commission is in charge of notifying right 
holders of the unauthorised dissemination of their work online, and to enforce the sanctions provided for 
under the HADOPI law. Article L.331-21 also grants the Commission the powers to investigate potential 
copyright violations, and - if necessary to do so - to request relevant ISP to disclose some of the 
information necessary to bring the investigation to an end.  
 
4. Procedural rules regulating the three-strike regime 
 
In order to counteract the growing amount of piracy in the digital world, the HADOPI law also introduced 
an additional system of penalties, applicable whenever an infringing act has been committed over an 
Internet connection. This new system of penalties - which came to complement the standard provisions of 
copyright law - take the form of a three-strike regime consisting of two preliminary operations 
(notifications and warnings) and one final repressive action involving fines and a potential suspension of 
Internet access.  
                                                   
9 LOI n° 2009-669 du 12 juin 2009 favorisant la diffusion et la protection de la création sur internet. 
10 LOI n° 2009-1311 du 28 octobre 2009 relative à la protection pénale de la propriété littéraire et artistique sur 
internet. 
11 LOI n° 2006-961 du 1 août 2006 relative au droit d'auteur et aux droits voisins dans la société de l'information 
Specifically, Articles L.331-17 and L.331-25 of the Intellectual Property Code stipulates that, upon 
receiving a claim for copyright infringement from the relevant right holders or their representatives (e.g. 
collecting societies), the HADOPI will initiate a 'three-strike' procedure which can be summarized in the 
following steps: 
 
1. A first warning (avertissement) is communicated via e-mail to the subscriber of the ISP, whose 
identity has been derived from IP address identified as the source of the alleged infringement. The 
warning notifies the subscriber of the alleged copyright violation and reiterate the obligation to 
secure the Internet connection, as provided for under the law (see Article L. 336-3 of the IPC). 
According to Decree n°2010-23612 of March 5th 2010, the warning must also provides the 
necessary information for the subscriber to requests further clarifications concerning the charges 
that he or she is being accused of, along with an overview of the possible penalties that might 
ensue from future or repeated infractions (see Articles L.335-7 and L.335-7-1 of the IPC).  
 
2. If, within the period of six months after the first warning, the same subscriber is identified as the 
source of another infringing act, a second e-mail warning is sent to the subscriber, along with a 
certified letter with acknowledgement of receipt (or any other means capable of proving the 
actual reception of such warning by the subscriber) containing similar content to the former 
notification. The subscriber has the opportunity to respond during a period of 15 days after 
receiving the letter, in order to provide justifications for the repeated infringement. 
 
3. If, within the period of one year after the second warning, the same subscriber is - once again - 
identified as the source of an infringing act, the HADOPI is entitled to start a procedure against 
that subscriber, which might result in a fine and, possibly, a temporary suspension of the Internet 
connection, along the interdiction to subscribe to any other ISP over a period of time ranging 
from 3 months to one year. In this last phase, the subscriber is entitled, if he so wishes, to 
challenge the decision taken by the HADOPI in front of a judge, by showing that he or she was 
not responsible for the alleged infringement, and that necessary measures had been taken to 
secure the Internet connection (the burden of proof is, of course, on the appellant). Alternatively, 
the subscriber might chose to negotiate for a reduced suspension’s period (between 1 and 3 
months) by admitting to have personally committed the infringing act and committing not to 
further engage into similar activities in the near future.  
 
The constitutionality of such solution has rapidly been challenged on the grounds that the law did not 
comply with the presumption of innocence and separation of powers, that it infringed upon the rights of 
defense, fair trial, and the right to be heard, and that the sanctions were anyways disproportionate to the 
tort to the extent that they constituted a potential violation of fundamental rights (Lucchi, 2011).  On may 
20th 2009, deputies from the Socialist, Communist and Green parties initiated an appeal to the 
Constitutional Court to deliberate on the constitutionality of the HADOPI law.13  On June 10th 2009, the 
                                                   
12 Décret n° 2010-236 du 5 mars 2010 relatif au traitement automatisé de données à caractère personnel autorisé par 
l'article L. 331-29 du code de la propriété intellectuelle dénommé « Système de gestion des mesures pour la 
protection des œuvres sur internet »  
13The constitutionality of the law was challenged on eleven different points, and it was thus requested that the law 
be either revoked or amended. For a more detailled overview, see  http://www.ecrans.fr/IMG/pdf/recourshadopi.pdf 
French Constitutional Court declared that the procedural rules establishing the three-strike regime were 
unconstitutional because incompatible with the French 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen.14 Indeed, it was held by the Court that, given the key role that the Internet plays in today’s 
information society, the right to freedom of expression naturally implies the right to access to the Internet. 
Since the latter is not an absolute right, disconnection is allowed. Yet, to the extent that cutting off 
someone’s access to the Internet might impinge upon the right to freedom expression, such a decision 
could not taken a mere administrative body. Only a judicial procedure could impose a temporary 
suspension of the Internet connection, whose overall duration should be proportionate to the tort. 
The HADOPI law has thus been amended by Law n° 2009-1311 on the criminal protection of creative 
works on the Internet15 (so-called HADOPI II law) to include judicial review before suspending one’s 
Internet connection. Yet, in the revised version of the law, Article L.335-7-2 of the IPC stipulates that the 
HADOPI is nonetheless entitled to rely on a simplified procedure to obtain a court order from a single 
judge trial (the same procedure used to deal with parking or speeding tickets). The judge is in charge of 
deliberating on whether to suspend the Internet connection (and for how long), as well as establishing the 
overall amount of the fine. It is worth mentioning that a decision from the judge to revoke a subscriber’s 
access to the Internet does not necessarily entail a termination of the contract -- i.e. the subscriber might 
still have to pay for the Internet connection, even if he or she cannot access it anymore. 
 
 
                                                   
14
 Décision n° 2009-580 DC du 10 juin 2009 du Conseil Constitutionnel 
15 LOI n° 2009-1311 du 28 octobre 2009 relative à la protection pénale de la propriété littéraire et artistique sur 
internet. 
Figure 1: Overview of the procedural steps of the three-strike regime under the HADOPI law 
Source: http://i.i.cbsi.com/cnwk.1d/i/tim2/2013/07/10/Schema_Reponse_Graduee_0.png 
 
5. Obligation to disclose subscriber’s personal data 
 
Decree n°2010-87216 of July 26th 2010 modifies article L.331-27 of the French Intellectual Property Code, 
which now stipulates that, whenever a particular IP address has been identified as the source of copyright 
infringement, the ISP is under the obligation to disclose the personal information (i.e. identity, address, 
telephone number and email contact) of the subscriber to which such IP address was assigned, under the 
simple request of the HADOPI. This is in contrast to the standard procedure for counterfeited goods 
which requires a judicial order from the court (i.e. a warrant). The law also stipulates that failure for the 
ISP to disclose such information constitutes a 5th order infraction, which is subject to a fine up to 1500 
euros. 
 
An important issue is, however, that it is not possible to rely only on the IP address to determine who is 
actually responsible (and should therefore be held liable) for an infringing act. Indeed, an IP address 
cannot be directly linked to an individual, nor even to a particular machine. Most ISP are offering Internet 
connection where a single IP is used in common by several users. Besides, WiFi connections are often 
shared among different persons, whose identities are not necessarily the same as those who subscribed for 
the Internet connection. Thus, it is easy for any alleged infringer to escape from liability by simply 
claiming that someone else was using the same Internet connection.  
  
6. Gross negligence for insecure Internet connection 
 
A potential solution to that problem has been proposed by Decree n° 2010-69517 of  June 25th, 2010, 
which introduces a tort of “gross negligence” (négligeance caractérisée, in French) concerned not with 
copyright infringement per se, but with the improper securitisation of the Internet connection.    
A similar tort had already been introduced in 2007 through the DADVSI law (transposing the European 
Copyright Directive into French legislation), which required effective securitisation of the Internet 
connection to prevent the exchange of copyright material without prior agreement from the right holders 
(see article L. 335-12 of the French Intellectual Property Code). Yet, under the DADVSI law, although 
subscriber were responsible for the use made of their Internet connection, there were no specific sanctions 
in place for the mere unauthorized usage thereof.  
Decree n° 2010-695 amends the Intellectual Property Code by introducing a new article (L. 336-3) which 
stipulates that “the subscriber to an Internet connection is under the obligation to ensure that such 
connection will not be used for the reproduction, representation, or making available of works protected 
by copyright or neighboring rights without the permission of the right holders, as specified within the 
books I and II of the same Code.”18 According to the Decree, in the absence of “legitimate motives” not 
to secure the Internet connection, liability for gross negligence might arise either from (a) the failed 
                                                   
16 Décret n° 2010-872 du 26 juillet 2010 relatif à la procédure devant la commission de protection des droits de la 
Haute Autorité pour la diffusion des œuvres et la protection des droits sur internet 
17 Décret nº 2010-695 du 25 juin 2010 instituant une contravention de négligence caractérisée protégeant la 
propriété littéraire et artistique sur internet 
18 Article 11 of the HADOPI law, incorporated as Art. L. 336-3 within the French Intellectual Property Code. 
attempt by subscribers to set up effective security measures aimed at precluding unauthorized access to 
their Internet connection, or (b) the lack of diligence in the implementation thereof. 
The tort of gross negligence is defined as a 5th order infraction, which might lead to a fine up to 1500 
euros, along with a potential suspension of the Internet connection for a maximum period of one month. 
The tort does not, however, constitutes a general obligation to secure the Internet connection. Liability 
might only arise after the third strike, after the subscriber has already been warned twice that his or her IP 
address had been found as the source of  infringing activities, and still has not attempted to secure the 
Internet connection. Yet, the law does not precisely stipulates the measures that need to be undertaken in 
order to secure an Internet connection. Hence, while they might have taken the appropriate steps to secure 
their connection (e.g. by protecting their wifi connection with a password and/or by installing software 
specifically intended to prevent the downloading of copyright infringing material), were their Internet 
connection to be identified as the source of an infringement, the subscribers claiming not to be the authors 
of the alleged infringement might nonetheless be held liable for gross negligence, to the extent that they 
did not effectively secure their Internet connection. 
 
It is important to note that the tort of gross negligence for the improper securitisation of the Internet 
connection is neither a precondition, nor a necessary consequence to a claim of copyright infringement. It 
merely constitutes an additional (complementary) course of action for right holders eager to dissuade 
users from infringing the copyright in their works - which does not prevent them from also issuing a 
claim against copyright infringement, if they so wish. Indeed, this tort does not constitutes an alternative 
to a claim for copyright infringement, but rather comes to complement this claim. Any individual whose 
Internet connection has been used for the purposes of copyright infringement remains, in fact, potentially 
liable for any civil and criminal penalties provided for under the law (see Article L. 335-2 of the French 
Intellectual Property Code). 
 
The introduction of such a tort constitutes perhaps a more effective mechanism against the practices of 
copyright infringement that have nowadays become pervasive on the Internet. It seems, indeed, more 
appropriate to counteract the rise of online piracy through an administrative sanction, rather than relying 
on (highly unpopular) criminal penalties, involving heavy fines and potentially even jail time.  Yet, such a 
legislative solution might engender a series of perverse and unintended consequences that have not been 
properly accounted for by the law.  
 
III. Perverse effects of the HADOPI law 
 
As a measure to counteract the growing popularity of illegal file-sharing, the HADOPI law might 
ultimately deprive the creative industries of at least a portion of their customers, but also encourage the 
use of more sophisticated techniques for the exchange of digital files, which have actually not been 
accounted for under the law. Most importantly, the introduction of a tort of gross negligence for failure to 
secure the Internet connection might end up reversing the presumption of innocence, as the subscriber of 
an Internet connection whose IP address has been identified as the source of an infringing act will be held 
liable for a secondary infraction, unless he or she can prove all necessary steps had been taken to secure 
the Internet connection.  
 
 
1. Effect on sales 
 
The three-strike regime has been enacted with a view to promote the economic interests of copyright 
owners, by deterring the use of peer-to-peer networks for the unauthorised exchange of copyright files. 
The effectiveness of these measures on reducing online piracy, and the impact they had on the sales of 
cultural content are, however, open to debate. 
In 2012, the HADOPI issued a report19 showing that, after the promulgation of the law, there had been a 
substantial decrease in the usage of peer-to-peer file-sharing networks (which went from 4.5 millions 
users in 2010 to 3 millions users in 2011). Shortly after, the International Federation of the Phonographic 
Industry (IFPI) representing the recording industry worldwide argued, in its 2012 Digital Music Report,20 
that the sales of digital music in France had been subject to a steady increase ever since spring 2009 
(when the law was still being debated in the National Assembly).  Subsequently, a study by Danaher & al. 
(2012) analysed the effects of the HADOPI law with regard to a few control groups (in the UK, Italy, 
Spain, Germany and Belgium) and concluded that the law significantly contributed to boosting the sales 
of the iTunes online music store in the French territory (with an estimate of over 13 million euros of 
increased revenues). Yet, most of the data used to substantiate these studies is taken from before 
HADOPI’s actual implementation into law. This, together with the bias inherent to the creative industries, 
which have often been accused of lobbying for stronger anti-piracy regulations by producing and 
promoting distorted statistics21 (Lessig, 2004; Lev-Aretz, 2013; Dobusch & Schüßler, 2014) is such that 
the accuracy of these claims is, to a large extent, questionable. 
Indeed, studies from academia and civil society have come to an entirely different conclusion.22 Several 
studies concluded that the HADOPI law had no substantial deterrent effect on copyright infringement 
(Dejean & al., 2010; Arnold & al., 2014). Others showed that the three-strike regime introduced by the 
HADOPI law might actually have a negative impact on the market for digital content (Huygen & al. 
2009; Poort & Rutten, 2010), since ‘digital pirates’ are often also the main purchasers of digital content 
on the Internet (Peukert & al., 2013). The HADOPI itself admitted23 that those who download the most 
content online are also those who purchase the most digital content from the cultural industries. In this 
regard, a study24 by the University of Rennes found that, while only 17% of those who do not engage in 
copyright infringement practices online actually purchase digital content, 47% of those who rely on file-
sharing for the exchange of digital files are also likely to purchase digital music or videos, whenever they 
                                                   
19 See the HADOPI Report: “Hadopi, 1 an ½ après son Lancement” from 2012, available at 
http://www.hadopi.fr/sites/default/files/page/pdf/note17.pdf 
20 See IFPI Digital Music Report of 2012, available at http://www.promusicae.es/documents/viewfile/86-ifpi-
digital-music-report-2010 
21 This was particularly visible during SOPA, PIPA and ACTA campaigns, where the creative industries extensively 
relied on biased data and statistics to substantiate their claims for the need of stronger Intellectual Property 
protection. See e.g. Lev-Aretz (2012). 
22 For a comprehensive overview of these studies, see https://wiki.laquadrature.net/Studies_on_file_sharing 
23 See the HADOPI Report: “Hadopi, biens culturels et usages d’internet: pratiques et perceptions des internautes 
français”, p.45 
24 The study is based on a sample of 2000 individuals from the Brittany region which have been subject to a 
telephone survey during a period of 3 months after the promulgation of the law HADOPI II. For more information, 
see Dejean & al. (2010). 
find something they like. Even better, according to a study25 undertaken by the Prospective Technological 
Studies of the European Commission’s Joint Research Center, most of the music that is consumed legally 
by the surveyed individuals would not have been purchased if they had not had access to illegal means for 
downloading that content. Accordingly, cutting people off the Internet because of the unauthorized 
exchange of copyrighted works on peer-to-peer file-sharing networks could potentially jeopardize a 
substantial part of the market for cultural content, and consequently eliminate a considerable source of 
income for right holders. 
 
2. Effects on copyright infringement 
 
With the HADOPI law, the French legislature tried to fight online piracy by implementing harsher laws 
against copyright infringement. Yet, by focusing on only one particular type of copyright infringement - 
the one achieved through the use of peer-to-peer file-sharing networks - the law might actually promote 
the very same practices that it was actually meant to deter users from. 
In a 2010 study26 from the University of Rennes analysing the impact of the three-strike regime on the 
behavior of Internet users, it was shown that the law had no substantial deterrent effect on file-sharing. 
Conversely, it was found that piracy actually increased of about 3% after the promulgation of the 
HADOPI law (Dejean & al., 2010). According to the study, two thirds of those who declared having 
given up on file-sharing as a result of the new sanctions introduced by the law, also admitted to have been 
exploring alternatives ways of getting copyrighted material online. Thus, while the number of users 
connected to peer-to-peer file-sharing networks has dropped (of 15%), there has been a notable increase 
(of 27%) in the use of alternative platforms or tools for copyright infringement which have not been 
properly contemplated under the law. This is the case, for instance, of direct download websites (such as 
Rapidshare, Megaupload, etc) and illegitimate streaming platforms (such as Allostreaming), but also 
legitimate platforms (such as Vimeo, Youtube or DailyMotion) whose content can be illegitimately 
download by means of specific applications (such as Streamget, Clickster, etc). Alternatives mechanisms 
are also acquiring more and more popularity, such as encryption tools, proxies, VPNs or anonymous relay 
networks (such as Tor) that make it difficult - if not impossible - for right holders to identify the content 
and/or the source of online communications.   
 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of the sources of copyright infringement before and after HADOPI.  
Source: Dejean & al., (2010). Available at http://www.marsouin.org/IMG/pdf/NoteHadopix.pdf 
 
                                                   
25 See the Institute for Prospective Technological Studies’ report: Digital Music Consumption on the Internet: 
Evidence from Clickstream Data, April 2013. Available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/131005609/JRC79605 
26 See footnote 22, Ibid. 
 
 
 
Overall, it appears that the increased usage of alternative tools for the exchange of digital files more than 
compensates for the reduction in the use of file-sharing networks (see Fig. 2). Individuals who are better 
informed about the risks of file-sharing have simply shifted away from monitored peer-to-peer networks 
towards other, unmonitored channels allowing for the illegal downloading of copyrighted content without 
any fear of retaliation (Arnold & al., 2014). Paradoxically, the draconian regime established by the 
HADOPI law might thus have supported online piracy, by promoting the use of alternatives platforms 
that were, until then, for the most part unknown to the public.  
What’s more, by pushing users away from traditional peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms, the HADOPI 
law actually contributed to the widespread adoption of encryption tools and anonymization technologies 
amongst standard Internet users. While this is not problematic as such, the widespread use of these 
technologies might have a negative effect on law enforcement, by making it harder for public authorities 
to fight not only against copyright infringement, but also against other types of criminal activities, such 
cybercriminality and terrorism. 
 
 
3. Effects on the presumption of innocence: “guilty until proven guilty”  
 
Perhaps one of the most perverse effects of the HADOPI law is its impact on due process and on the 
presumption of innocence. Article 9 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen 
stipulates that “every man is presumed innocent until proven guilty”. Yet, in the first version of the law, a 
mere administrative agency (the HADOPI) was entitled to decide on whether (and for how long) to 
disconnect an alleged infringer without passing through a judicial procedure. Although the subscriber 
always had the chance to appeal against the decision of the HADOPI, the constitutionality of the law had 
immediately been challenged on the grounds that it was reversing the burden of proof: instead of the 
HADOPI having to show that the subscriber was guilty of copyright infringement, it was for the 
subscriber to prove that, in spite of his or her due diligence, someone had managed to hack into the 
Internet connection. The law was eventually struck down by the Constitutional Court,27 and replaced 
shortly afterwards by an amended version (HADOPI II), according to which only a decision by the 
criminal court could result into an actual suspension of a subscriber’s Internet connection.   
 
But even in its amended version, the HADOPI law is not devoid of any perverse effects. The law 
maintains, indeed, the distinction between online copyright infringement (which is regarded as a 
misdemeanor, punished with a considerable fine and a potential suspension of the Internet connection for 
up to one year) and the tort of gross negligence for failure to monitor one’s Internet connection (which is 
regarded as a petty offense, the maximum punishment for which is a only small fine and a shorter term of 
suspension).  
This distinction is useful to the extent that it creates new avenues for prosecution. Rights holders eager to 
enforce the law over alleged infringers now have a new option: either they sue them for copyright 
infringement, or they go after the breach of duty to monitor the Internet connection -- or both.  
Yet, such distinction might be difficult to put into practice, since both charges relate to the same 
underlying offense: copyright infringement. Thus, although the two offenses are kept separate under the 
law, the provisions of the law does not properly distinguish between a criminal offender (driven by 
malicious intentions) and a petty offender (with no criminal intentions) that simply did not exercise due 
diligence when securing his on her Internet connection. What’s more, the law does not even precisely 
stipulates what constitutes a secure Internet connection; subscribers are not told how to secure their 
connection, nor which tools they should install in order to escape for potential liability for gross 
negligence.  
Hence, regardless of the efforts which have been undertaken to secure the connection, it is always 
possible for a third party to hack into someone’s Internet connection view a view to commit an infringing 
act without incurring liability from it. And yet the tort of gross negligence makes it really hard for the 
subscriber of such Internet connection to disclaim responsibility from it. Regardless of whether the 
subscriber did, in fact, contribute to the infringing act, he or she will nonetheless be held liable for failure 
to properly secure the Internet connection. Paradoxically, the mere fact of denying responsibility for 
copyright infringement (despite the IP address having been detected as the source of the infringing act) 
can be used as a means to prove that the obligation to secure the Internet connection has not been 
respected -- which in itself constitutes an infraction.  
From a legal perspective, this is problematic in at least two ways. On the one hand, this goes counter the 
doctrine of vicarious liability, according to which a judge might only impose responsibility upon one 
person for the failure of another, with whom the former has a special relationship.28 On the other hand, 
this might also go counter the presumption of innocence, by moving away from the principle of “innocent 
until proven guilty” towards the more controversial principle of “guilty until proven guilty” -- i.e. the 
subscriber is trapped in between two provisions:  if he or she claims not to be responsible for the 
infringing act (which was therefore due to a third party hacking into the Internet connection), the 
subscriber might then be held liable of gross negligence for failure to secure such connection.  
                                                   
27 Décision n° 2009-580 DC du 10 juin 2009 du Conseil Constitutionnel 
28 The doctrine of vicarious liability is common law doctrine that renders one person liable for the torts committed 
by another person. The classic example is that of employer and employee: the employer is rendered strictly liable for 
the torts of his employees, provided that they are committed in the course of the tortfeasor's employment. In such 
circumstances, liability is imposed on the employer, not because of his own wrongful act, but due to his relationship 
with the tortfeasor (Giliker, 2010). Other common situations in which vicarious liability might apply include 
parental relationship, or the relationship between a principal and an agent. 
 
The introduction of the tort for gross negligence constitutes, in fact, an ingenious trick to the extent that it 
makes it possible to incriminate alleged infringers by holding them liable for a smaller, administrative 
infraction, without having to go through the long and arduous procedure of criminal proceedings. Of 
course, as opposed to copyright infringement which might involve criminal sanctions, failure to secure the 
Internet connection might only result into a few administrative sanctions - which are generally much less 
severe, but also not subject to the same legal safeguards as their criminal counterpart (in terms of e.g. 
procedure and formalities, intentionality, burden of proof, etc).  Although necessarily rooted into an 
action for copyright infringement, the tort of gross negligence constitutes, in fact, a civil infraction which 
can be resolved through the much easier and more expedite procedure of civil proceedings. 
In this regard, it might be worth questioning the constitutionality of this regime. Indeed, while the first 
version of the HADOPI law has been struck down on the ground that it was constitutionally unsound, it 
could be argued that the revised version of the same law (HADOPI II) contemplates similar - albeit more 
hidden - elements of unconstitutionality. Since one cannot rely exclusively on the IP address which 
constitutes the source of an infringing act in order to determine the identity of the infringer, it is extremely 
difficult for anyone to prove who should, indeed, be held responsible for copyright infringement. And yet,  
the legislator has found an ingenious way to bypass the issue, through the introduction of a tort for failure 
to secure one’s Internet connection -- thereby allowing for public authorities to incriminate subscribers 
who had not (yet) been ‘proven guilty’ under an secondary administrative tort, without having to prove 
neither intentionality nor damages. 
 
IV. Unintended effects of the HADOPI law  
  
The HADOPI law was introduced as a legislative measure to discourage online piracy and file-sharing 
through a system of ‘graduated response’. In practice, however, the law has been fairly incapable of 
achieving that objective. As previously illustrated, the law did not actually succeed in counteracting the 
constant rise of online piracy, nor did it succeed in discouraging the use of peer-to-peer file-sharing 
networks, which are still widespread on the Internet.29  
In its first Activity Report,30 released 18 months after the graduated response was introduced into 
legislation, the HADOPI disclosed that, thus far, no one had been subject to any sanction or fine. Yet, the 
governmental agency has been receiving an average of 70.000 complaints per day, for a total of over 18 
million IP addresses reported as the source of potential infringements since october 2010. Only 1 million 
of them have been communicated to the corresponding ISPs so as to obtain the identity of their 
subscribers. During these first 18 months, the HADOPI issued a first round of warnings to over 47.000 
                                                   
29 Tru Optik recently released statistics estimating that every month more media content is downloaded 
by file sharers than are sold on iTunes, Google Play and Amazon combined. The US accounts for 
10.57% of all global P2P users. As of March 2014, 31.7 million unique IP addresses were engaged in file 
sharing, up from a monthly average of 28.2 million in 2010. More information available at truoptik.com 
30 HADOPI, Rapport d’Activité 2010, available at: http://www.hadopi.fr/sites/default/files/page/pdf/rapport-
d-activite-hadopi.pdf 
subscribers, only 20.000 of which also received a second warning. The number of cases that could lead to 
actual prosecution for the third strike were in the number of ten, each of which need to be deliberated 
individually by the HADOPI.  Overall, since the creation of the HADOPI in 2009, only one individual 
has effectively been convicted to having his Internet connection suspended for a period of 15 days, along 
with a fine of 600 euros.31 The injunction has, however, never been enforced, as the law had since then 
been reformed to remove the possibility for the HADOPI to cut off a subscriber’s Internet connection.32  
 
But while it failed in the fight against online piracy, the introduction and current implementation of the 
three-strike regime might still have serious implications on users’ fundamental rights, such as the right to 
privacy and anonymity. Besides, the additional penalties introduced by the HADOPI law (and, in 
particular, those related to the tort of gross negligence for failure to secure one’s Internet connection) 
could give rise to a series of unintended consequences that might negatively affect different sectors of 
activities, which are beyond the original scope of the law.  
The issue is closely related to the question of establishing the ‘target’ of the law - i.e. what types of 
activities was the law meant to regulate, and who are the actors that should ultimately be affected by the 
law. The three-strike regime was specifically designed to regulate only one particular type of 
misbehavior, i.e. copyright infringement. Yet, if we look at the consequences it had in practice, the 
HADOPI law seems to have missed the ‘target’ given that it only had a marginal impact on reducing 
online piracy. Conversely, the law might have unintentionally hit a different target, insofar as it might 
impose a series of restrictions or limitations on different fields of endeavor, including legitimate activities 
– such as, most notably, the deployment of community mesh networks – which had never been 
contemplated by the legislator. 
 
1. Privacy & Anonymity 
 
Important critics have been raised against the three-strike regime, and its negative implications on the 
privacy of Internet users. According to many,33 an improper implementation of the graduated response 
might lead to a situation of generalized surveillance that would necessarily impinge upon the privacy of 
Internet users, regardless of whether or not they have been involved into an allegedly infringing activity. 
In this regard, according to the French Data Protection Authority (CNIL), the law did not establish a 
proper balance between the need to protect the intellectual property of copyright owners, and the potential 
harm to the privacy of end-users that the three-strike regime might entail.34   
Indeed, in order to be able to prosecute copyright infringers, the HADOPI needs to obtain information as 
regards the identity of these infringers.  Hence, Internet communications – and in particular those taking 
place over peer-to-peer file-sharing networks – are  increasingly being monitored by public (and private) 
                                                   
31 In June 2013, for the first time in France, an individual was sentenced to having his internet connection 
temporarily cut off for an overall duration of 15 days by the Tribunal d’instance de Seine-Saint-Denis, for 
having downloaded illegal content despite the multiple warning letters sent by the HADOPI. 
32 Décret n° 2013-596 du 8 juillet 2013 supprimant la peine contraventionnelle complémentaire de 
suspension de l'accès à un service de communication au public en ligne et relatif aux modalités de 
transmission des informations prévue à l'article L. 331-21 du code de la propriété intellectuelle  
33 Proponents of this view include several civil society organisations, such as April, Aful, La Quadrature 
Du Net, or the consumer protection association UFC Que Choisir. 
34 Délibération n°2008-101 du 29 avril 2008 portant avis sur le projet de loi relatif à la Haute Autorité pour 
la diffusion des œuvres et la protection des droits sur internet 
authorities, with a view to identify the source of infringement. Yet, if monitoring the network is necessary 
for enforcing copyright law, is the threat of copyright infringement sufficiently high to justify the 
establishment of a system of generalized surveillance that might actually discourage the usage of peer-to-
peer communication networks, even when those are employed for perfectly legitimate purposes? Besides, 
the question remains as to who should be in charge of monitoring the traffic transiting through these 
networks, and what is the level of surveillance that can be legitimately undertaken without impinging 
upon users civil liberties and fundamental rights?  
In France, Trident Media Guard (TMG)35 – a company specialized in monitoring the traffic of peer-to-
peer file-sharing networks - has been designed as the entity in charge of identifying all IP addresses which 
constitute the source of an infringing act on the Internet, and reporting them to the HADOPI for further 
processing by the ISP. TMG has since them been collecting data and metadata concerning the exchange 
of files on multiple peer-to-peer file-sharing networks, producing a massive collection of IP addresses 
with a view to identify potential copyright infringers. As a result, the company has been awarded the 2010 
“Internet Orwell prize” during the French Big Brother Awards,36 on the grounds that its activities 
significantly undermined users’ fundamental right to privacy. The harm is not only theoretical, since, in 
2011, a security breach was discovered on TMG’s servers, which accidentally opened a portion of its 
database, resulting in the unauthorised disclosure of thousands of personal data records.  
 
In addition to the negative impact it has on the fundamental right to privacy, the current implementation 
of the graduated response might also severely affect the ability for users to connect to the Internet 
anonymously. Today, many public spaces (such as cafes, restaurants, hotels, airports, libraries, 
universities or parks) provide Internet connectivity by opening their network to the public at large, often 
without requiring any kind of subscription or registration. By making these intermediaries liable for any 
potential misuse of their Internet connection for the purposes of copyright infringement, the HADOPI law 
might either dissuade them from providing free Internet access, or require them to install specific 
technical means to establish the identity of users and/or prevent unauthorized access to copyrighted 
works. At the individual level, by introducing a tort of gross negligence for failure to secure one’s Internet 
connection, it becomes increasingly unlikely that the actual subscribers to an Internet connection enable 
others to connect freely (and anonymously) to their own network. The result is a negative externality 
characterized by a potential reduction in Internet accessibility and a definitive impairment to users’ 
privacy and anonymity – an unintended consequence that does not reflect the original intention of the law. 
 
2. Community mesh networks 
 
If go further into the analysis, we might notice that the HADOPI law could give rise to other unintended 
consequences (or externalities) that were not properly contemplated by the legislators. 
                                                   
35 TMG works with TV broadcasters, Sports right holders, Film producers and distributors, and Music 
publishers to manage, protect and analyze live and recorded content on internet and TV. More 
information is available on their website http://www.tmg.eu 
36 The Big Brother Awards recognize "the government and private sector organizations [...] which have 
done the most to threaten personal privacy”.  The contest is organized in many countries by local NGOs 
and the awards are intended to draw public attention to privacy issues and related trends in society, 
especially in data privacy. More information at http://www.bigbrotherawards.org/ 
Externalities are widespread in the legal realm. These can be either positive or negative - see e.g. the 
impact on freedom of expression caused by a variety of laws preventing libel or hate speech (Mayton, 
1984; Massaro, 1990; Stefancic & Delgado, 1992); the establishment of a de facto access right stemming 
from the legal protection granted to technical measures of protection under copyright law (Heide, 2000; 
Ginsburg, 2002), or simply the harm to individual privacy resulting from regulations intended to preserve 
public order and national security (Mell, 2002; Arnbak & Goldberg, 2014). While people generally 
rejoice at positive externalities, negative externalities often remain unnoticed for a long time, until they 
become so widespread that they become an actual constitutive part of the ecosystem and can no longer be 
distinguished from the whole.  
Thus, in order to fully understand the impact of the French HADOPI law, it also needs to be assessed not 
only with regards to the consequences it might have on copyright infringement, privacy or anonymity, but 
also on the likelihood of users sharing their Internet connection to the public at large. This is especially 
relevant in the context of community mesh networks, where the proper functioning and operation of the 
network depends, for the most part, on getting a sufficiently high number of individuals making their 
Internet connection available to third parties. 
In a nutshell, community mesh networks are decentralized network infrastructures that rely on the 
resources provided by a distributed and loosely coordinated network of peers to provide connectivity to a 
particular community of peers (Zhang & al., 2006). These networks are operated by the community and 
for the community. They are decentralized insofar as network configuration is not achieved by any central 
authority, but rather by means of a specific mesh routing protocol which automatically organises and 
coordinates network resources through a decentralized approach. In this sense, the transmission of packets 
does not rely on any predetermined route; the route is dynamically established by every node connected to 
the network who repeatedly communicates with some of its neighboring nodes to figure out what is the 
best route, at any given moment, to transfer packets through the network (De Filippi & Tréguer, 2014). 
To the extent that mesh networking requires people sharing their Internet connection to third parties, are 
these emerging practices potentially affected by the HADOPI law? In order word, shall individuals 
voluntarily sharing their Internet connection and providing a gateway for people to connect anonymously 
to the Internet be held liable of gross negligence for failure to secure the access to their Internet 
connection?  
The law stipulates that, unless there are “legitimate motives” justifying the lack of securitization, the 
subscriber to an Internet connection is to be held liable for any copyright infringement stemming from 
such connection. The tort of gross negligence can thus be regarded as a means for the State to extend its 
sovereignty over community mesh networks (which are, by virtue of their decentralized character, 
inherently difficult to regulate) by delegating to the subscribers of an Internet connection the task of 
policing the network so as to avoid liability on their part. The result is, of course, a lower incentive for 
people to share their Internet connection to the public at large and, consequently, a reduction in the 
number of users that will contribute their own resources to support the operations of community mesh 
networks. 
This is a good illustration of how the HADOPI law might come with a series of unintended consequences 
that go well beyond the intended scope of the law. While it is questionable whether or not the legislator 
had actually foreseen this problem (i.e. whether this result was premeditated or not), it appears, 
nonetheless, that the law has eventually shifted away from its original focus on copyright infringement, to 
cover other legitimate activities that do not have anything to do with online piracy. Indeed, the HADOPI 
law was never meant to restrict or even regulate the use and deployment of community mesh networks; 
yet, as an attempt to counter copyright infringement, the three-strikes regime indirectly (and negatively) 
affected the ability for people to share their Internet connection freely and anonymously. The 
consequence is a restraint on the ability for users to communicate with each other in a way that is both 
anonymous and autonomous (i.e. that does not require passing through a centralized authority or ISP in 
order to connect to the Internet).  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As a general rule, estimating the success of the law is a subjective task, which is ultimately a matter of 
perspective and degree. Yet, it might be possible to come up with more objective assessment by 
comparing the actual impact of the law against the intended impact of the law. This requires analysing not 
only the extent to which the law succeeded in regulating what it was meant to regulate, but also the effects 
it had on what it was actually not meant to regulate.  
With regard to the French HADOPI law, if one considers the intention of the legislators in charge of 
implementing the law, it is difficult to deny that they have actually failed in their intent of decreasing the 
rate of online copyright infringement.  It would seem, indeed, that the graduated response missed its 
original target (that of discouraging copyright infringement) and hit a different target instead. Originally 
meant to dissuade potential infringers from illegitimately transferring copyright protected files over peer-
to-peer file-sharing networks, the three-strike regime has been implemented into French legislation in 
such a way that it might end up harming the interests of the public at large.   
In this paper, we presented the HADOPI law as a prototypical example of legislative serendipity 
producing a lot of unintended and perverse effects. Indeed, not only did it fail at putting an end to the 
unauthorized exchange of digital content, it also caused damages to the users of peer-to-peer file-sharing 
networks (including those who legitimately use them for the exchange of files that does not give rise to 
copyright infringement) whose privacy has been severely injured by the practices of mass surveillance 
that emerged onto these networks.  
Besides, by making users liable for sharing their Internet connection in a non-securitized manner, the 
HADOPI law also had a series of negative externalities or unintended effects on other types of activities 
which are not directly connected with the issues of copyright infringement (and which are thus rarely 
taken into account, simply because they stand outside of the scope of the law).  
It can sometimes be very  difficult to assess the negative impact that specific laws or regulations had on 
different sectors of activity, especially when it comes to measuring the damages resulting from the “loss 
opportunities” caused by these laws. Yet, it could be argued that, by introducing the tort of gross 
negligence for failure to secure one’s Internet connection, the law effectively reduced the incentives for 
people to deploy alternative networks structures based on community participation and cooperation – 
thereby precluding or, at least, significantly limiting the deployment of community mesh networks, and 
consequently reducing the opportunities for the establishment of a more grassroots and decentralized 
approach to the currently centralized Internet infrastructure. 
 
Ever since its creation in 2009, the efficiency and constitutionality of the HADOPI law has been 
constantly put into question, and the law has been subject to a series of reforms and amendments to try 
and resolve these concerns. It is only in 2013 that the French government eventually admitted that such 
implementation of the three-strike regime had actually been a mistake: not only did it fail to achieve the 
expected results with regard to copyright infringement, but it also went counter to the concept of sharing 
and collaboration that characterise most of the emerging practices online. Besides, the HADOPI agency, 
although ineffective, was very costly to operate. 
On July 8th, 2013, the provisions of the HADOPI law allowing to terminate the Internet connection of of 
alleged individual infringers were abrogated by law decree n° 2013-596.37 The law was amended to 
remove the “additional misdemeanor punishable by suspension of access to a communication service” on 
the grounds that preventing subscribers from accessing the Internet because of alleged copyright 
infringement was a disproportionate measure that impinges upon human rights. Yet, the provisions 
establishing possible fines (up to 15000 euro in the case of gross negligence) for copyright infringement 
have been preserved, along with the obligation for ISPs to disclose personal information concerning 
alleged infringers. Finally, given the overall inefficiency of the procedure, the French Ministry of Culture 
declared in a press release38 that the HADOPI would no longer be in charge of overseeing the process of 
graduated response, and that the implementation of the three-strike regime will be transferred instead to 
the national media regulator, the Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel. 
This is might be regarded as a sign that the law is evolving towards a more sensible solution. And yet, if 
we look at the details of the suggested reform, it appears that it might actually turn out to be much worse 
for end-users. Surely, a temporary suspension of one's Internet connection is no longer possible under the 
new three-strike regime, but what will it be replaced with? One possible solution - promoted by the 
creative industry and, in particular, by the French Union of Independent Phonogram Producers (UFPI) - is 
to introduce a systematic fine (of about 140 euros) that every subscriber shall pay whenever his or her 
Internet connection is used for the purposes of copyright infringement[@@Ref]. In other words, the idea 
is, again, to complement (or perhaps supplement) the criminal charges for copyright infringement (which 
require on a long and bureaucratic procedure of warnings and notifications, as well as the intervention of 
a judge in order to inflict the penalty) with a system of administrative sanctions that can be issued directly 
by the HADOPI itself, or by its successor the CSA. This ultimately means shifting away from a criminal 
liability rule, towards a civil liability rule based on the automatic imposition of a fine upon every 
ascertained infraction (just like it is currently done with speeding tickets and other civil liability torts).  
The graduated response is evolving, indeed; but while it is apparently becoming less strict and oppressive 
(as the ultimate penalty of disconnection has been revoked), in practice, if such a model of systematic 
fines were to be approved by the Constitutional Council,  the resulting regime would end up being much 
more intrusive than the original three-strike regime. Again, France seems to be a pioneer in this field, with 
the introduction of new  legislative measures which might actually go counter the traditional principles of 
law (in terms of due process and the presumption of innocence) and might eventually lead to a number of 
unintended consequences that yet cannot be foreseen.  
 
 
 
 
                                                   
37 Décret n° 2013-596 du 8 juillet 2013 supprimant la peine contraventionnelle complémentaire de 
suspension de l'accès à un service de communication au public en ligne et relatif aux modalités de 
transmission des informations prévue à l'article L. 331-21 du code de la propriété intellectuelle.  
38 Publication du décret supprimant la peine complémentaire de la suspension d’accès à Internet du 9 
juillet 2013. 
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